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Why is the meme Darwinian evolution successful?  This paper will argue that its 
continuing propagation is related to the following claims regarding On the Origin of 
Species: 
•  within its theory, species -  the thing itself, fully defined - does not exist 
•  it implies and implements a differential strategy.  Species is an effect of 
the analysis of differences, and these differences provide an underlying 
“structure” to the work 
•  the milieu of this differential strategy is excessive, conforming to a 
general (not restricted) economy 
•  at the limit, it implies no origin of species 
•  its argument and structure are capable of being turned back upon itself 
(as illustrated in the first sentence of this abstract) 
In showing that these characteristics share a structure with the meme represented 
by a tradition of thought extending from Nietzsche’s differential anti-nihilism to 
Deleuze’s philosophy of difference and Derrida’s thought of différance, the 
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Species do not exist 
In 1968, Jacques Derrida writes and delivers a short essay entitled Différance.  If, in 
Archilochus’ terms (Diehl 1930: frag 103, quoted in Berlin 1966: 1), Derrida is a hedgehog 
with one significant “idea” rather than a fox with many, then this essay should rank as the 
most succinct and intense presentation of it, running as it does in a few short pages (21 
excluding notes, in English translation) through questions of the origins of writing, 
Saussure’s semiotics, Plato, Koyré, Hegel, Nietzsche, Freud, Deleuze, Levinas, Heraclitus, 
Anaximander and Heidegger.  This “idea” has the status of something like Dawkins' meme 
(Dawkins 1989: 189-201) which – to use his terms – are “replicators” of the “cultural 
world” which itself – like life – evolves.  This device has the status within “human culture” 
that genes have for life.  Both are replicators, that is, entities which have “the 
extraordinary property of being able to create copies of” themselves (15) , copies which 
are more or less exact (16) and which are propagated by means of “vehicles” – that is, 
“large communal survival mechanisms” – such as individual bodies or, in the case of 
memes, the larger cultural milieu in which they flourish or the material means (writing, 
speech, song, image) by which they are communicated.  
 
Derrida’s “idea”, or “meme”, as well as being engaged in a milieu of “differential survival” 
(192), concerns itself with these differential milieu.  To take the essay at its most 
straightforward point, here is Derrida as he joins with Saussure's Course in General 
Linguistics: 
 
  Let us cite Saussure only at the point which interests us: “the conceptual side of 
value is made up solely of relations and differences with respect to the other terms 
of language, and the same can be said of its material side…  Everything that has 
been said up to this point boils down to this: in language there are only differences 
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between which the difference is set up; but in language there are only differences 
without positive terms.  Whether we take the signified or the signifier, language 
has neither ideas nor sounds that existed before the linguistic system.  The idea or 
phonic substance that a sign contains is of less importance than the other signs 
that surround it.” 
 
  The first consequence to be drawn from this is that the signified concept is never 
present in and of itself, in a sufficient presence that would refer only to itself.  
Essentially and lawfully, every concept is inscribed in a chain or in a system within 
which it refers to the other, to other concepts, by means of the systematic play of 
differences.  Such a play, différance, is thus no longer simply a concept, but rather 
the possibility of conceptuality, of a conceptual process and system in general 
(Derrida 1982: 10-11) 
 
What is to be emphasised here is not so much the definition of Derrida’s neologism 
différance – which means something like the possibility of differences, that which allows 
differences to happen – but rather two characteristics in Saussure’s linguistic theory which 
Derrida draws attention to and which are also characteristic of Darwinism: 
 
1.  an anti-essentialism, or a distrust of what we might crudely term the 
notion of “the thing itself” as a singular “object”, secure in its identity.  
This has been remarked upon by Philip Kitchen in Giving Darwin his Due, 
where he noted Darwin’s “anti-essentialist message” (401-402).  As 
Darwin puts it when announcing his revolution: “Systematists will be 
able to pursue their labours as at present; but they will not be 
incessantly haunted by the shadowy doubt whether this or that form be 
in essence a species” (Darwin 2003: 394) 
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and, as the other side of this coin: 
 
2.  a differential strategy; in place of “the thing itself” as that which 
determines how we are to think, or with what we are to think, comes a 
play of differences, the effect of which may be something like a given 
work, a given thing more or less secure in its identity, a given species or 
variety of species, more or less (depending on specific “historical” or 
temporal circumstances) secure as a “thing” 
 
Let us at once say that this anti-essentialism (Derrida will put it in different terms), this 
appeal to something other than the fixed identity of a given language or a given species 
(both in the case of Derrida/Saussure and Darwin) does not dispose of the concept of 
species and language, nor does it reduce them to untruth, illusion or matters to be avoided.  
To the contrary.  It disposes such concepts.  The inscribing of “the thing” within a 
differential structure is precisely what enables these two concepts to operate effectively as 
matters for thought, and most particularly to reveal both as coming to exist in the way 
they are now by means of and within a history/temporality which at each moment has 
been affected (acted upon).  As Darwin has it, “we regard every production of nature as 
one which has had a history”.  Now that which acts, that which effects (the history of) 
species/language may be generally inaccessible, but this inaccessibility does not prevent us 
from positing and acknowledging the necessity of the existence of this effective agent.  
Again in principle, the idea of this differential history does not, of itself, deliver any bias as 
to the exact type of reason for this or that change; nor does it, in principle, posit that any 
given change will be of large or small magnitude.  In Darwin, what is posited is the 
constant possibility of infinitesimally small variations and differences as well as not-so-
small differences, either of which may come to affect history; or either of which may have 
no discernable result, depending on circumstances. 
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Differential Strategy 
As with Saussure, so also with Nietzsche and Giles Deleuze’s interpretation of Nietzsche 
which Derrida cites in his essay.  Derrida writes (Derrida 1982: 17) after quoting Deleuze’s 
book on Nietzsche and Philosophy, “is not all of Nietzsche’s thought a critique of 
philosophy as an active indifference to difference, as the system of adiaphoristic reduction 
or repression?”  Deleuze, and Derrida after him, are contrasting the Nietzschian position of 
celebrating difference as originating theme with philosophy’s attempt to suppress 
difference, to make difference per se derive from the same; the attempt to make difference 
secondary to sameness.  Deleuze, in his Difference and Repetition, published in the same 
year as Derrida’s Differance essay, takes the overturning of this bias as the starting point 
for a much more extensive critique – unlike Derrida, ostensibly within a discourse which 
remains comfortable with its philosophical character – of identity and the submission of 
difference to it.  For Deleuze, difference is, per se, the positive.  Difference is the positive, 
and that from which identity is derived or forged, always in a subsequent and secondary 
operation.  The determining of difference as negative, the wrapping up of difference in a 
(Hegelian) dialectic, is to submit it to identity and is for Deleuze to be deprecated, just as 
Derrida dismisses the “simple dialectical complication of the living present” (Derrida 1982: 
18)  – being “the style of transcendental phenomenology” (Derrida 1973: 152) which he 
has (although more tentatively) deconstructed in his first published work The Introduction 
Husserl’s Origin of Geometry (1962) in the name, already, of the “differant” (spelt with an 
“a”).  In this regard, Saussure will be found wanting by Deleuze, who cites him in 
frustrated tone immediately after the passage which Derrida quotes (cited above, 
Saussure: 118): “why does Saussure, at the very moment when he discovers that ‘in 
language there are only differences’, add that these differences are ‘without positive 
terms’ and are ‘eternally negative’?....Everything points to the contrary.”  Derrida’s “nearly 
total affinity” (Derrida’s own words; 2001:192) with Deleuze, with his “theses of an 
irreducible difference in opposition to dialectical oppositions… a difference in the joyously 
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from 1968 The Linguistic Circle of Geneva (Derrida, 1982: 137-153) where (148-149) 
Saussure’s granting of “an ethical and metaphysical privilege to the voice” and an 
“inferiority of writing” is shown to be one with a simple notion of representation (against 
which, too, the whole of Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition rails); or a reading of Of 
Grammatology (Derrida, 1976: 52)  where Saussure gets opposed to himself over this 
question of the supposed non-priority of writing. 
 
Deleuze will argue that it was Darwin himself whose “great novelty, perhaps, was that of 
inaugurating the thought of individual difference.  The leitmotiv of The Origin of Species is: 
we do not know what difference is capable of!” (Deleuze, 1994: 248) In contrast to 
philosophy’s concern for essence or the discovery or positing of the thing itself, 
Nietzsche’s strategy, according to Deleuze, is to make these derivative of something more 
original.  That something is difference.  The same goes for Darwin.  In Darwinian terms, 
we would say that in place of the thing or essence “species” we have the phenomena of 
“differences between” species.  Species do not disappear, but they become derived, a 
secondary aspect of the system, inessential; and thus, Darwin says, we are freed up from 
a whole realm of concerns about the exact taxonomy of species and their distinctions and 
given another realm of more fertile investigation to follow.  Deleuze makes the same point 
in relation to “the great taxonomic units – genera, families, orders and classes” which “no 
longer provide a means of understanding difference by relating it to… identities….On the 
contrary, these taxonomic units are understood on the basis of…. difference” (248).  He 
will here also draw an analogy between Darwin and Freud (“Darwin’s problem is posed in 
terms rather similar to those employed by Freud”), in that they both ask how differences, 
per se, become “connected and fixed differences”.  Reverting to Derrida, Freud in 
Differance is cited as thematising a “diaphoristics” immediately after the quoting of 
Deleuze mentioned above (Derrida 1982: 18) and just prior to the deconstruction of 
“transcendental phenomenology”. 
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Derrida and Deleuze deploy a similar strategy in relation to the written word of difference 
when addressing these problems.  For Derrida, the term differance, spelt with an “a”, is a 
neologism which can say two things at once, “at the same time” (itself a constant theme 
in his work): differing and deferring, spatial difference and temporal difference/delay, the 
vertical and horizontal axes of structuralism at the same time, the genetic and the 
structural simultaneously.  As such, differance is the possibility for differences to occur.  
And the term cannot be heard: the word in French sounds the same as its near-relative 
différence, a slight variation which can only be distinguished through writing (not the 
spoken word).  Derrida emphasises this throughout the Differance essay, and as is well 
known this issue becomes thematised in Of Grammatology.  Derrida is careful, it seems 
throughout his whole work, to avoid any analogy or comparison between it and the 
concerns of the natural sciences or mathematics, but in drawing the structural similarity 
between it and Darwin’s “heuristic device” (to use Gayon’s term: 245) we might venture 
that, in setting up a conceptual play of differences in the field of evolution, Darwin has 
been attentive to differance; that is, he has experienced its possibility; further, he has 
given the possibility its chance, he has “actualised” it, to use Deleuze’s term. 
 
Deleuze also plays with an unheard difference, a difference that can only be written: that 
between differentiation and differenciation.  “The greatest importance must be attached to 
the ‘distinctive feature’ t/c as the symbol of Difference: differentiate and differenciate” 
(Deleuze 1994: 279).  The complex notion of “(indi)-different/ciation”(279) says at once 1) 
the “perplication” of the Deleuzian Ideas, their co-extensive (ie their simultaneous, at-the-
same-time) differentiations and 2) the “complication” of the Ideas’ actualisation within 
differenciations.  In contrast to Derrida, Deleuze has no hesitation in engaging his 
philosophy with the natural sciences and mathematics, and as has already been noted, he 
identifies Darwin’s The Origin of Species as a singular event – together with Freud – 
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understood on the basis of ….the differenciation of difference”, that is, Darwinism 
actualises an Idea by a differenciation into these “taxonomic units”; and this “Idea” is 
differential relations, “difference of intensity” (251).  But further, the “differential of the 
Idea” (201), the Idea as “complex theme” (183) reconciles, Deleuze says, “genesis and 
structure”, as for Derrida differance says genesis and structure at the same time.  It is true 
that Derrida will specifically warn us against eliding the term “differentiation” with the 
“neographics” of “differance” (Derrida 1973: 143).  However, such elision, he says, would 
omit the temporal “deferring” of the latter, and would derive differences from an initial 
unity (ie from identity), and since the whole of Deleuze’s text is directed against such a 
derivation of difference we should perhaps therefore in this case read beyond Derrida’s 
mistrust of the term, and accept a commonality of purpose between the two terms. 
 
We may say, then, that in so far as the differenciation of species proceeds from a 
differentiation or from the possibility granted by differance, Darwin’s move is one of an 
“essential” affirmation of difference. 
 
Excessive Milieu 
Now the milieu, the mise en scène, in which this event can occur (that which in 
encompassing it gives it its possibility) is a milieu of the excessive.  In Derrida’s terms, this 
can be expressed by means of Bataille’s notion of a “general economy” to which he makes 
brief reference in Differance and which is contrasted with that of the “ restricted 
economy” of a utilitarian system: 
  In a reading of Bataille, I have attempted to indicate what might come of a rigorous 
and, in a new sense, “scientific” relating of the “restricted economy” that takes no 
part in expenditure without reserve, death, opening itself to nonmeaning, etc, to a 
general economy that takes into account the nonreserve (Derrida 1982: 19; he is 
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Without Reserve 1978: 251-277) 
The characteristics of the Darwinian, Derridian and Deleuzian memes which we have 
explicated so far (non-essentiality; differential strategy), and those which we will address 
below (non-origin; recursion to a self become non-self) can only occur within a “system” 
which is not limited by the restricted economic logic which Bataille outlines.   It can only 
occur within what Bataille calls a “general economy”.  A restricted economy is one where 
the movement of differences is held fast by some principle – in Deleuzian terms, where the 
philosophy of difference is sacrificed to identity (something he cannot stand).  It is an 
economy where phenomena are related back to a principle (the location of god – we will 
come to this below) which provides both an origin and the possibility of an essence for 
them.  By contrast, a general economy stays faithful to and allows the possibility of the 
various characteristics of the D-memes (as we might call them), and in doing so repeats 
Deleuze’s philosophy of difference by staying within the “state of excess” with which he 
concludes Difference and Repetition (304).  This is also, structurally, the theme of “play” 
without ground so important to a reading of Derrida’s work, announced perhaps most 
succinctly in the penultimate piece in Writing and Difference (published in 1967) entitled 
Structure Sign and Play in the Human Sciences (278-293), where he famously states that 
“the absence of the transcendental signified extends the domain and the play of 
signification infinitely” (280); and later “this affirmation [the Nietzschian one]… plays 
without security” (292). 
 
Bataille’s general economy has been evoked by Bagemihl in the closing chapter to 
Biological Exuberance, his study of extravagance (particularly homosexual) in the animal 
world.  As Bagemihl says of Bataille, “according to his views, excess and exuberance are 
primary driving forces of biological systems, as much if not more so than scarcity” 
(Bagemihl: 253).  That is, a general economics of life must be recognised, within which 
any restricted economy can operate: “conventional thinking regards the diversity and 
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evolution… for Bataille, this relation is reversed: exuberance is the source and essence  of 
life, from which all other patterns flow” (254-255). 
 
Did Darwin ever claim otherwise?  Natural selection doubtless operates according to a 
restricted, utilitarian economy.  As “the preservation of favourable variations and the 
rejection of injurious variations” (Darwin 2003: 144) – whether or not one regards this as 
merely an analytic (and therefore a priori) statement in Kantian terms – natural selection 
releases variations to the future by judging them against their utility in ensuring survival.  
But as Darwin himself recognised, and as is essential for the workings of his principle of 
natural selection, it can only occur within a general economy of exuberance, since “there is 
no exception to the rule that every organic being naturally increases at so high a rate, that 
if not destroyed, the earth would soon be covered” (134) and “every single organic being 
around us may be said to be striving to the utmost to increase in numbers” (136).  Without 
this original exuberance, the “struggle for existence” could not exist, and nor could the 
restricted economy of the survival of variations “useful to each being’s own welfare” 
(175).  That this economy is restricted is specifically allowed for within Darwin’s text, 
where it is stated that “variations neither useful nor injurious would not be affected by 
natural selection” – in other words, the economy of natural selection is restricted to 
operating only on those variations which confirm to its utilitarian principle, and the milieu 
of all variations (useful or not) is the general economy within which this can occur. 
 
No Origin 
Derrida’s essay Differance is a deconstruction of origins, a thought consonant with the 
death of god and the removal of a prime location, and we will find that implicit in the 
structure Darwin set up is the removal of any notion of the origin of species – consonant 
too with Deleuze’s destruction of the philosophy of identity.  In the conclusion to Origin of 
Species, Darwin equivocates around the issue of what might be found at the head of the 
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beginning of this system of differences.  The equivocation is between “four or five 
progenitors” (Darwin 2003: 394) of animals – this would be, for Darwin, the largest 
possible number of original species – or, taking the matter a step further by means of 
analogy, just one prototype.  And whilst analogy “may be a deceitful guide”, nevertheless 
“therefore I should infer from [it] that probably all the organic beings which have ever lived 
on this earth have descended from some one primordial form, in which life was first 
breathed” (ibid).  As he concludes “there is a grandeur in this view of life, with its several 
powers, having been originally breathed into a few forms or into one; and that…from so 
simple a beginning endless forms most beautiful and most wonderful have been, and are 
being, evolved.” (Darwin 2003: 398) 
 
In positing one or several “origins of species” Darwin remains faithful to that view of the 
task of the scientist as one who searches for secondary laws, not primary ones, a view, 
according to David Hull, that “Darwin had known from Herschel”.  To quote Hull quoting 
Herschel:  “Herschel had warned that to ascend to the  ‘origin of things, and speculate on 
the creation, is not the business of the natural philosopher’.”  (Hull 2003: 182). Hull claims 
that Darwin, at the end of Origin of Species, “had made no such ascent” (ibid). I would 
differ with the baldness of this statement: Darwin did make the ascent, in positing either 
one or a few origins of species which, by implication at least, were to be viewed as 
creations of a creator God, but this convinced no-one.  Nor should one be convinced. 
 
The happy knowledge of the death of god, announced by the madman in the marketplace 
in Nietzsche’s Die Froehliche Wissenschaft, makes way – structurally - for the possibility 
of a general economy and for the possibilities of excess, differentiation, differance….  The 
death of god - the disappearance in the system of philosophy or thought of a prime mover 
or location guaranteeing the system - makes possible the de-essentialising of thought and 
allows the play of differences to claim a primary position, a play which henceforth will, for 
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Darwinism is driven by the same concern or the same possibility of the displacement of 
God from the system it is studying.  This seems true structurally of Darwinism and, 
arguably, biographically, taking the hints which Darwin gives in his Autobiography where 
he states that “a man who has no assured and ever present belief in the existence of a 
personal God… can have for his rule of life.. only to follow those impulses.. which are the 
strongest or which seem to him the best ones… - As for myself I believe that I have acted 
rightly in steadfastly following and devoting my life to science.” (extract from the 
Autobiography in Darwin 2003: 434). 
 
If we accept that Darwinism is, at its most abstract, the application of a general principle 
of differentiation to the problem of the origin of species, then the mechanics of this 
principle already imply that, at the origin and in place of a fixed essence of position at the 
origin, we again find something like differentiation –not a thing in itself.  In other words, 
there is no proper origin, no God (another name for the same thing), at the origin of 
species. 
 
This does not mean that the scientific search for a deeper understanding of how the 
“origin” of life or its precursors arose is invalid; quite the contrary.  By, at the limit, 
positing no origin, but rather something like Derrida’s differance – that is, the possibility of 
differences rather than any specific difference itself (which would inevitably collapse into 
its terms and thus reify an origin again), the Darwinian machine or device leaves science 
open to ever further investigations, unblocked by any moment of dogma.  Such is the 
meaning of science or, rather, of wissenschaft, of science and knowledge broadly spoken 
– and in that sense it remains faithful to that other heuristic device set up by Plato in the 
Timaeus (among other places) where he asserts, before all else, that the things themselves 
are unknowable and that all we have to work with are opinions regarding them.  Far from a 
limitation on human knowledge, this reveals the strength of it, for science and knowledge 
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forever open to development, evolution, what Derrida – following Husserl – calls “an open 
horizon and the breakthrough towards the infinite of an ‘immer wieder’ or an ‘und so 
weiter’ [the again and again]” (Derrida 1989: 135), and the repetition (within which 
identity can occur as an effect) of which Deleuze speaks in the wake of Nietzsche. 
 
Counter-turn 
Darwin’s professed desire for human mental powers and capacities to be opened to the 
strategy of the Origin of Species (Darwin 2003: 397) leaves the strategy itself open to 
modification and evolution, particularly as, at the outset, he is at pains to emphasise the 
“imperfection” of the work (Darwin 2003: 95).  The immediate cause of the imperfection 
is the work’s status as an Abstract, without all the “references and authorities for [its] 
several statements” (Darwin 2003: 95).  But another, more general interpretation of this 
admitted weakness would characterise it as an inherent or inevitable one, leaving the 
“theory” or “argument” or “heuristic device” (Gayon: 245) of the Origin of Species open to 
amendment, transformation, development, perfectibility without perfection or absolute 
rightness – in short, to evolution.  Thus, it seems, the structure of the work is such that it 
can be turned back on itself to work on itself and its ideas.  It appears to be not so much a 
“device” as a “machine” with a feed-back mechanism, an early example perhaps of a 
“system” in the terms of von Bertalanffy’s General System Theory. Bertalanffy, in arguing 
(29-52) the basis of system theory, uses embryonic development and evolution as 
examples, and emphasises their “equifinal processes” (43), that is, “the tendency towards 
a characteristic final state from different initial states… based upon… an open system” 
(45).  As he says, “it can be shown that the primary regulations…. ie those which are 
most fundamental… in evolution, are of the nature of dynamic interaction” (43). 
 
Thus, within a general de-essentialising, excessive and non-originary economy, it is at least 
possible to pose the question: why is the meme “Darwinian evolution” so successful? and 
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structure it, work on it, to repeat, as it were, its functioning as a machine or device or a 
system.  (This is indeed something which Dawkins appears to allow for (195-196), 
although the paragraph in which he does so begs the very question we are asking here.  If, 
as he says, “each individual has his own way of interpreting Darwin’s ideas” (195); and 
yet there is “an essential basis” of Darwin’s theory, what becomes of the anti-essentialism 
it has been our task to essay?  What if the essence of Darwinism is non-essence?)  This 
self-referentiality is, in terms of a classical or linear logic, a worrying characteristic; we are 
taking a realm or structure of knowledge and applying to the whole of that realm a 
technique which is arguably either an integral part of it, or is derived from it.  Certainly 
Bertrand Russell’s theory of types (Russell 1992: 59), which held that in order to state 
something about the whole of a set, one had to do so from the position of a meta-set (ie a 
set of a different type, in Russell’s terminology) in order to avoid paradoxical statements, 





1.  what the machine or strategy cannot question, if it is to operate, is its 
initial defining characteristics of differentiality and the intrinsic non-
existence of the “thing itself” – these two being two sides of the same 
coin.  The heuristic device called Origin of Species can operate on itself 
or on parts of itself up to the limit of these aspects of itself, but no 
further, for the obvious reasons that if the differentiality were to be 
removed and the “thing itself” (ie species, or when being evolved, the 
heuristic device of Origin of Species itself) reified and made fixed, then 
the machine would at that point grind to a halt.  We might think of that 
moment as the moment of dogma 
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2.  the differential strategy already undoes the power of a linear logic such 
as Russell’s Theory of Types, or rather makes it irrelevant, since such 
logic presupposes sets of phenomena which are fixed in order to 
generate the paradoxes.  As soon as the thing which is being discussed 
becomes precisely that, a discussion, something which is intrinsically 
differential, then the fixity of the set falls away, together with the type 
of paradox associated with it.  Or rather, the paradox or aporia can 
remain, but can come to be regarded as a positive characteristic of the 
strategy - a pointer or hint that things are going well 
 
In what way would this self-referentiality be different from the constant demand of 
philosophy for self-elucidation and self-reflection, a demand which virtually defines 
philosophy in its essence?  In what way does Deleuze’s philosophy of difference differ 
from the philosophy of identity, and in what way is Derrida’s differance beyond philosophy  
- as he hopes for?  Is Darwin’s Idea (in the Deleuzian sense) simply the re-deployment of 
philosophy’s defining strategy?  Is this possible turning back on itself of evolutionary 
theory simply the working of, say, Kant’s transcendental moment, the moment he 
announces thus: “the term ‘transcendental’, that is to say, signifies such knowledge as 
concerns the a priori possibility of knowledge, or it’s a priori employment” (1929: 96)?  Is 
it not the moment of a philosophy defined by Husserl – “ratio in the constant movement of 
self-elucidation” (1970: 338)? 
 
If we remain there, within a restricted economy, within the closure of philosophy, ratio and 
the Kantian transcendental, we will not see the possibilities of the Darwinian device.  We 
will be forgetting (as Dawkins does) the anti-essentialism which it has set up and which it 
implies, and which Derrida invokes when he asks of Husserl’s statement: “but what is the 
self (selbst) of this self-elucidation (selbsterhellung)?” (1989: 146) For it is not just a 
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origins in the name of differance, the de-essentialising implications of Darwin, affect/effect 
too this “self”, so that its pre-existence is destroyed.  The return to the self becomes 
instead, in Nietzsche’s terms, invoked by Deleuze at the beginning of Difference and 
Repetition, the “return of the same”, the “of” being read in the genitive complexity so 
central to Derrida’s whole work and announced first in his Introduction to Husserl’s 
Geometry where he states that “this ‘of’ concerns the… relation in which subject and 
object are reciprocally engendered and governed” (1989: 142-143).  Nietzsche’s “eternal 
return does not bring back ‘the same’, but returning constitutes the only Same of that 
which becomes…. Returning is… the … identity of difference, the identical which belongs 
to the different, or turns around the different” (Deleuze  1994:41).  In general terms, this 
is to say that identity (essence, origin) is the effect of difference, the effect of return; or 
alternatively, difference affects (ie assumes, takes on the appearance of) identity.  In our 
specific terms, this means that the identity of Darwinism, if we accept the premise of its 
anti-essentialism (which gets the whole movement, or return, going) and apply it to itself, 
is constituted within its own ability to re-cast and remake itself – its ability to evolve. 
 
This falling back upon the non-self, the only means by which the self (or any identity) can 
occur, as an effect of difference, as difference affected, is echoed in the closing pages of 
Derrida’s Differance essay, in his reference to the Heraclitean play of “the one differing 
from itself, the one in difference with itself” (22).  This is Heraclitus’ fragment 51: 
  They do not understand how, while differing from, it is in agreement with itself.  
There is a back-turning connection, like that of a bow or lyre” (37) 
 
It is this back-turning connection, this reference back to what is not permitted, by the logic 
of this meme itself, to simply be the meme; it is this “counter-turn of the beginning”, to 
use a phrase coined by Duettmann (2002: 143-183); it is this differance at the origin, this 
non-essentialism given its possibility by a general and excessive economy, by means of a 
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do its work, to propel itself into a future.  The mark, surely, of memetic effectiveness. 
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